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ANTITRUST LABOR PROBLEMS: LAW AND POLICY
EDWARD H. MILLER*
Interest in the applicability of the antitrust laws to certain activities of organized
labor has been heightened by the current drive of the Department of Justice to
eliminate unreasonable restraints of trade in the building industry, in which some of
the indictments already returned have been against labor organizations and their
leaders. A question, agitated from time to time ever since the Sherman Act was
passed, is again being raised, namely, whether the Act applies to the activities of labor
organizations at all and, if so, to what extent. The total exemption of labor unions
from the application of the antitrust laws has been twice urged upon federal courts
within recent months, in the Supreme Court of the United States in the Chicago
Milk case,1 and in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Apex
Hosiery Company case.2
In the Chicago Milk case, for example, the exemption was asserted by counsel in
blanket and unqualified terms; its acceptance in the form urged would permit a
labor union and its members acting either alone or in concert with others to engage
in combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, even though unconnected with
labor activities or purposes and, no matter how unreasonable, with complete im-
munity from prosecution under the antitrust laws.
Such a blanket exemption is negatived by the historical and legislative background
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, by their language, and by unequivocal judicial
construction. Not even a dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever intimated that such an exemption exists. And the case against the
blanket exemption need not be based on a failure of proof; these same factors amply
and affirmatively demonstrate that labor unions must use their collective power
within the limits marked out by labor law, and with due regard for the public
interests expressed in other contemporaneous legislation.
*A.B., 1928, Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1931, Harvard University. Member of the
Missouri Bar. Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, Antitrust Division, U. S.
Department of Justice, since March 1939.
1 U. S. v. The Borden Co., 6o Sup. Ct. x82, decided Dec. 4, 1939, reversing a judgment sustaining a
demurrer to the indictment, 28 F. Supp. 177 (N. D. Ill. 1939). The question of the Act's applicability to
the labor union defendants was held not to be before the Court on the appeal.
a Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., io8 F. (2d) 7, decided Nov. 29, 1939.
A NRmusT LABoR PROBLEMiS: LAW AND POLICY
I
Section i of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal.3
Apart from Section 2, dealing with monopolies, and apart from enforcement pro-
visions, the quoted language is the Sherman Act in its original form. This language
is unambiguous and unqualified and read literally it includes every combination and
conspiracy in restraint of trade, whether engaged in by labor organizations or others.
Those who contend that the Act grants immunity to labor rest their case chiefly
upon its legislative history. It is impossible here to examine the question of the
weight to be accorded the debates and committee reports in the interpretation of a
given statute, but certainly the two-year's history of the Sherman Act does not. point
convincingly in support of the immunity claim. Scholars examining that history have
reached conflicting conclusions.4 It is my opinion that the contention that labor
should be subject to the Act is the more persuasive. In the debate in the Senate it
was argued that the bill, if enacted, would be employed to oppress labor and agricul-
tural organizations, and Senator Sherman offered a proviso exempting the activities
of such organizations from the Act. Senator Edmunds attacked this proviso on the
floor of the Senate. The bill was then referred to the Judiciary Committee of which
Senator Edmunds was chairman. The language of the bill was materially altered
by the Ccmmittee, and no proviso exempting labor was included. Senator Edmunds,
who had vehemently opposed the exemption, professed himself satisfied, and no
reference to the labor problem appears in the subsequent debates in either Senate or
House.
It has been argued that the elimination of the proviso clearly indicates that Senator
Edmunds' view prevailed. If so, why did not the protagonists of labor voice objection
to it? On the other hand, it is contended that the revised bill, by restricting the Act's
applicability exclusively to business combinations, made specific exemption of labor
unnecessary. But the latter explanation begs the question in issue and leaves Senator
Edmunds' acquiescence unaccounted for. A solution which will explain the recon-
ciliation of the conflicting senatorial positions is that, while the revised bill was
26 STAT. 209 (890), 15 U. S. C. §§1-7.
For a statement of the position that the Act was intende& to apply to labor, see MASON, ORGANIZED
LABOR AND THE LAw (1925) cc. VII, VIII. For the opposing view, see BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN
Act (930) Pt. I.
A view that the Sherman Act was intended to apply to a very limited range of labor activities, if any, is
developed in a recent article. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (939) 39 COL. L. Rav. 1283,
(940) 40 COL. L. Ray. 14. The author ascribes the Sherman Act to Senator Hoar, points to "Senator
Hoar's statement in debate that the bill was intended to affirm "the old doctrine of the common law," and
then seeks to demonstrate that historically the common law did not classify labor combinations as contracts
in restraint of trade. The thesis assumes (I) senatorial familiarity with the precise bounds of the common
law doctrine of agreements in restraint of trade as developed by the author, and (2) an intent to confine
the statute to those bounds despite the inclusion in it of terms such as "conspiracy" and "commerce"
which were not appropriate to the statement of the common law doctrine.
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applicable to labor, nevertheless it applied only to unlawful labor activities. The bill
to which the proviso had been appended gave justifiable grounds for believing that
activities of labor unions which had previously been regarded as lawful would be in
violation of its terms.5 The removal of this threat by the revision of the bill sufficed
to satisfy the advocates of the proviso without. giving to labor a blanket immunity
which would have met with the continued opposition of Senator Edmunds.
Within four years the Sherman Act was successfully invoked to restrain two major
strikes, one the great Pullman strike of 1894, but it was not until 19o8 that the Supreme
Court, in Loewe v. Lawlor,6 first applied it to labor organizations. The Court after
reviewing the historical and legislative background of the statute concluded that labor
could not properly claim to be wholly exempt from this law of the land.
Three years later the decision in Standard Oil Company v. United States,7 holding
that illegal combinations could be dissolved under the Sherman Act, caused union
leaders to become apprehensive that unions might be dissolved under the Act, and
agitation was vigorously renewed for protective legislation having as its primary
object the removal of the possibility that, under the doctrine of the Standard Oil Com-
pany case, all associations and combinations of workers might be subject to dissolution
regardless of the extent of their activities. Protection against this threat was promised
in the Democratic platform in the presidential campaign of 1912 and the promise
made good by the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914.
Two sections of the Clayton Act are relied on by proponents of the blanket exemp-
tion, Sections 68 and 20. Section 20 prevents the granting of injunctions by federal
courts against'specified labor activities which even at the time were generally con-
sidered legal, such as peaceful picketing. By implication it left undisturbed the illegal-
ity attaching to certain other conduct.
Section 6, after declaring that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce," provides that "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations ... or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws." This section was the answer to the promise made in
1912, following the apprehensions engendered by the Standard Oil Company decision.
It removed all doubt of the right of labor to organize in unions, and affirmed the
legality of their status against any fear of dissolution. By the use of such language
as "legitimate objects," and by legalizing not the acts of labor organizations or their
" The language arousing this apprehension appeared in Section i and read as follows: ".... all arrange-
ments, trusts, or combinations between such citizens [i.e. two or more citizens of different states] or cor-
porations, made with a view or which tend to advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles
[i.e., "articles of growth, production or manufacture"],-arc hereby declared to be against public policy,
unlawful, and void." A union seeking to increase wages or shorten hours might have been assailed as a
combination seeking "to advance the cost to the consumer" of the articles made by the union members.
8208 U. S. 274. T221 U. S. 1 (191x).
s38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §17. #38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. §52.
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members, but only the organizations and members themselves, it plainly is confined
to an attempt to protect labor unions against a charge of an unlawful status.
With the Clayton Act, as with the Sherman Act, the legislative history denies the
blanket exemption claim.10 In the course of debates in the House, and after a ques-
tion had been raised as to the meaning of Section 6 and particularly the meaning of
the declaration that labor is not a commodity or article of commerce, a clear-cut
exemption proviso was offered by way ,of amendment and rejected. The Supreme
Court took the first opportunity to refute, in very explicit language, the suggestion
that the Clayton Act had created any such blanket immunity. In Duplex Printing
Press Company v. Deering,11 a majority of the Court held that Section 6 of the
Clayton Act protected only the existence of labor organizations.
The Court has consistently rejected the blanket immunity. In addition to the
cases cited, immunity was denied in 1926 in United States v. Brims;12 in 1927 in
Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association;'3 and in
1934 in Local 167 v. United States.'4 In the Stone Cutters' case, as in the Duplex case,
the holding was directed specifically to Section 6 of the Clayton Act. And in the
Brims and Local r67 cases, no dissents were announced.
Other antitrust labor decisions have been characterized by vigorous dissents, prin-
cipally by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. These dissents have turned mainly
on the question of what interest in and relationship to a labor dispute a participant
must have to justify his activities. No dissenting opinion has ever suggested that,
regardless of any interest in or relationship to a dispute, the participant can justify
his activities merely because he acts as a member of some labor organization.
Probably, in the view of both the majority and the minority of the Court, the labor
provisions of the Clayton Act were merely declaratory. The majority in American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council'5 stated that the act was "merely declaratory of
what was the best practice always" and Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion
in the Stone Cutters' case, said that
.. The Act does not establish the standard of reasonableness. What is reasonable must
be determined by the application of principles of the common law, as administered in
federal courts unaffected by state legislation or decisions.1 6
The labor implications of the antitrust laws have been the subject of persistent
and prolonged public discussion, but, despite the plain language of the statutes and
their plain construction by the Supreme Court as not according to labor organizations
a blanket exemption, no action has at any time been taken by Congress to amend
the statutes so as to provide for such an exemption. It cannot be said that throughout
this period Congress has been indifferent to the welfare of labor or to the interests of
labor organizations. It has enacted legislation designed to prevent the abuse of the
2' See MAsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, c. X.
11254 U. S. 443 (921). 12272 U. S. 549 (i926).
23 274 U. S. 37 (1927). id 291 U. S. 293 (934).
25257 U. S. 184, 203 (1921). is274 U. S. at 58.
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injunctive process in labor disputes; 17 legislation designed to protect and preserve
the right of labor. to bargain collectively and the right of labor organizations to be
free from employer interference;' 8 legislation designed to protect the wages and
hours of labor;' 9 and legislation designed to provide protection foi workers against
the hazards of unemployment and old ageY°
The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is particularly significant in this con-
nection because it shows just how far Congress was willing to limit the application
of the antitrust laws, after a legislative gap of many years, bridged by frequent at-
tempted amendments and almost constant consideration. The act merely prohibits
the use of injunctions against labor organizations with respect to labor disputes. It
removes no other penalties or remedies. It does not even prohibit the remedy of
injunctions against labor unions when they are not engaged in labor disputes.
This act, passed after almost twenty-five years of controversy over the decisions
applying the Sherman Act to labor, shows better than anything else that Congress
accepted the Supreme Court decisions as they stood and changed what it considered
to be established law only to the extent of the right to obtain injunctions.
It is in the public interest to protect and preserve labor organizations, just as it
is in the public interest to protect and preserve agricultural cooperatives and the
proper use of the corporate franchise. But no groups can properly lay claim to a
complete exemption from the statutes designed as the principal bulwark to protect a
free economy. Nor can those statutes be effectively enforced against one economic
or business group and not against others similarly situated. The use of labor organ-
izations to police or to enforce dombinations and conspiracies designed to protect
manufacturers, distributors, and others engaged in industry is a persistent and fre-
quent phenomenon. The antitrust laws must largely fail in their purpose if they can
be applied only against some members of such combinations and conspiracies and
not against all. Quite apart from the wisdom or equity of prosecuting one member
of a conspiracy and at the same time permitting his partner in the offense to go free,
effective enforcement cannot be conducted on such principles. More, therefore, is
here involved than a question of the reasonableness of classifying different economic
groups. The problem is a practical one. Under the most favorable conditions the
difficulties of enforcing the antitrust laws are great. These difficulties are multiplied
if blanket immunities are conferred upon favored groups so that the enforcing officers
may prosecute some of the guilty but not all, and may eliminate some aspects of a
combination or restraint without destroying it completely.
The Department of Justice thus rejects, as have the Congress and the Supreme
Court of the United States, the notion that labor unions are entitled to a blanket
exemption from the antitrust laws.
. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (932), 29 U. S. C. §ioi et seq.
"'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.o 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §51 et seq.
"Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. io6o (938), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq.
'o Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 620 (z935), 42 U. S. C. §30z et seq.
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II
Assuming, then, that labor unions must govern their activities in the light of the
antitrust laws, to what extent do those laws affect them? Although the Supreme
Court has only once, in the Window Glass case,2 1 indicated that the rule of reason
applies to labor antitrust cases, it would seem that here, as in the case of activities by
industry, no better criterion could be found. With labor, as with industry, it is
difficult to determine reasonableness of conduct in the abstract. The problem of anti-
trust enforcement can never be settled by definitions. The case-by-case approach
technique is the only sound one. But with the necessity of a preliminary govern-
rental decision on the advisability or duty of instituting proceedings on each set of
facts presented, some statement of policy from the Department that is obliged to
make the decisions can be of some value, however general it must be. The position
outlined below is largely derived from statements of the Department's policy which
have heretofore been made public.
The antitrust laws should not be used as an instrument to police strikes or
adjudicate labor controversies. In each of the Supreme Court cases referred to above
the question was presented whether the particular restraint involved was unreason-
able and was not calculated to achieve a legitimate labor purpose. The right of
collective bargaining by labor unions was and is recognized by the antitrust laws to
be a reasonable exercise of collective power. The Department does not question, or
have any desire other than to protect, the right of labor unions to use their bargaining
power legitimately to consolidate it, to forestall speed-up systems, and to improve the
condition of their members by promoting improvements with respect to wages, hours,
health, and safety. To restraints of trade resulting incidentally from such activities,
the rule of reason prefixes the legalizing "reasonable."
In the current building investigation a large number of legitimate activities of
labor unions have been brought to the attention of the Antitrust Division. It has
been asked to proceed against labor unions because they maintain high rates of
wages, because they strike to increase wages, and because they attempt to establish
the closed shop. All such requests have been consistently disregarded.
Refusals by unions to work on goods made in non-union shops have also been
brought repeatedly to the attention of the Division. In the past courts have held that
such secondary boycotts are violations of the antitrust laws. In the Duplex22 and
Stone Cutters'2 3 cases a minority of the Supreme Court presented the argument
against this view. In view of such a conflict of opinion among judges of the highest
court as to the reasonableness of such activities, the attorneys in the building investi-
gation have been instructed not to institute criminal prosecutions in such cases.
The kinds of activities which will be prosecuted may be illustrated by a practice
frequently found in the building industry. Suppose a labor union, acting in combina-
tion with other unions to dominate building construction in a city, succeeds by threats
"1 National Ass'n of Window Glass Manufacturers v. U. S., 263 U. S. 403 (1923).
" Supra note xl. 2 Supra note 13.
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of strikes or boycotts in preventing the use of economical and standardized building
material in order to compel persons in need of low-cost housing to hire unnecessary
labor 2 4 Here is a situation having no reasonable connection with wages, hours,
health, safety, or the right of collective bargaining. The union may not thus per-
petuate unnecessarily costly and uneconomical practices in the housing industry. Pro-
gressive unions have frequently denounced this "make work" system as not to the
long-run advantage of labor. Such unions have found it possible to protect the
interests of labor in the maintenance of wages and employment during periods of
technological progress without attempting to stop that progress. They have been able
to protect labor from abuses connected with the introduction of improved methods
of production without preventing the improved methods.
The Chicago Milk case25 is another illustration. There the indictment charges
that the defendant union has combined and conspired with business corporations and
with an agricultural cooperative association to fix and maintain artificial and non-
competitive prices for milk moving in interstate commerce and to restrain and control
the supply of that milk. If the allegations of the indictment are established, it would
seem clear that the union has chosen to act as a private police force to enforce by
intimidation and violence an illegal arrangement and that its activities go far beyond
the legitimate objects of a labor organization.
Such a situation would not be one in which the union in the course of a dispute
with an employer over wages, hours, working conditions, or the right to bargain
collectively has engaged in some activity such as a strike or boycott which has had
the incidental effect of restraining interstate commerce. Just as in the case of United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Cod Company,26 in which the incidental effect of the
strike on interstate commerce was held not to be sufficient to justify the injection of
the Sherman Act into the dispute as an employer's weapon, so in the milk case the
incidental benefits to the union and its members are not enough to justify a claim by
them of an immunity from prosecution based on their right to act in concert.
There can be no choice in these matters. Faced with a barrage of complaints, the
Department of Justice has no alternative but to take action in those situations which
it believes wiolate the law. The building drive is not against labor unions. It is
against alr of those persons or groups who are found to have entered into unreason-
able agreements in restraint of interstate trade and commerce. This means that the
Department will proceed against manufacturers, distributors, contractors, labor or-
ganizations, or individuals connected with any of the above groups, when evidence
convincingly indicates that they have violated the law. The Department of Justice
" Virtually this situation was presented in U. S. v. Painters' Dist. Council No. 14, 44 F. (2d) 58
(N. D. Il1. 1930), afl'd, 284 U. S. 582 (193) (per curiam), holding in violation of the Sherman Act
union activity to prevent the shipment into Chicago from other states of cabinets and other woodwork in
other than an unfinished condition.
"
5 Supra note x.
2 259 U. S. 344 (1922). This is the first of two decisions by the Supreme Court in this litigation.
In the second case, 268 U. S. 295 (1925), the Court found that the union had sought to influence the
market for coal produced in other states and thus had subjected interstate commerce to a direct rather than
an incidental restraint.
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must enfor.e the law impartially in any situation which it is compelled to enter. Any
attempt to eliminate unlawful restraints in the building industry which deliberately
and systematically excludes labor unions, irrespective of the nature of their activities,
would be a travesty. Rather than try to proceed along such lines the Department of
Justice might as well drop all efforts to clear away unlawful restraints in the building
industry.
The types of unreasonable restraint against which the Antitrust Division has
recently proceeded or is now proceeding illustrate concretely practices which are
unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act, suppoited by no responsible judicial
authQrity whatever.
i. Unreasonable restraints designed to prevent the use of cheaper material, im-
proved equipment, or more efficient methods. An example is the effort to prevent the
installation of factory-glazed windows or factory-painted kitchen cabinets.
2. Unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and unneces-
sary labor. An example is the requirement that on each truck entering a city there
be a member of the local teamsters' union in addition to the driver who is already on
the truck. Such unreasonable restraints must be distinguished from reasonable re-
quirements that a minimum amount of labor be hired in the interests of safety and
health or of avoidance of undue speeding of the work.
3. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce systems of graft and extortion.
When a racketeer, masquerading as a labor leader, interferes with the commerce of
those who will not pay him to leave them alone, the practice is obviously unlawful.
4. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce illegally fixed prices, as in the
Chicago Milk case.
5. Unreasonable restraints designed to destroy an established and legitimate sys-
tem of collective bargaining. Jurisdictional strikes have been condemned by the
A. F. of L. itself. Their purpose, is to make war on another union by attacking em-
ployers who deal with that union. There is no way the victim of such an attack may
avoid it except by exposing himself to the same attack by the other union. Restraints
of trade for such a purpose are unreasonable whether undertaken by a union, or by
an employer, or by a combination of a union and an employer, because they represent
an effort to destroy legitimate collective bargaining relationships, assuming the estab-
lished union is a bona fide one.
The principle applicable to unions is the same as that applicable to other groups
specially protected by law. Investors may combine into a corporation, farmers into a
cooperative, and, labor into a union. The Antitrust Division has the duty of prevent-
ing such legal rights of association from being used for purposes far different from
those contemplated in the statutes, when such uses result in unreasonable restraints of
interstate trade or commerce.
